We provide a formal treatment of security of digital signatures against subversion attacks (SAs). Our model of subversion generalizes previous work in several directions, and is inspired by the proliferation of software attacks (e.g., malware and buffer overflow attacks), and by the recent revelations of Edward Snowden about intelligence agencies trying to surreptitiously sabotage cryptographic algorithms. The main security requirement we put forward demands that a signature scheme should remain unforgeable even in the presence of an attacker applying SAs (within a certain class of allowed attacks) in a fully-adaptive and continuous fashion. Previous notions-e.g., security against algorithm-substitution attacks introduced by Bellare et al. (CRYPTO '14) for symmetric encryption-were non-adaptive and non-continuous.
INTRODUCTION
Balancing national security interests with the rights to privacy of lawful citizen is always a daunting task. It has been particularly so in the last couple of years after the revelations of Edward Snowden [36] that have evidenced a massive collection of metadata and other information perpetrated by several intelligence agencies. It is now clear that intelligence operators were not just interested in collecting and mining information but they also actively deployed malware, exploited zero-day vulnerabilities, and carried out active attacks against standard protocols. In addition, it appears some cryptographic protocol specifications were modified to embed backdoors.
Whether this activity was effective or even allowed by the constitution is open to debate and it is indeed being furiously discussed among policy makers, the public, and the intelligence community. Ultimately, a balance between security and privacy must be found for a free and functioning society.
The ability of substituting a cryptographic algorithm with an altered version was first considered formally by Young and Yung (extending previous works of Simmons on subliminal channels [40] ), who termed this field kleptography [43, 44] . The idea is that the attacker surreptitiously modifies a cryptographic scheme with the intent of subverting its security. This research area has recently been revitalized by Bellare et al. [6] who considered encryption algorithms with the possibility of mass surveillance under the algorithmsubstitution attack. They analyzed the possibility of an intelligence agency substituting an encryption algorithm with the code of an alternative version that undetectably reveals the secret key or the plaintext. What they uncovered is that any randomized and stateless encryption scheme would fall to generic algorithm-substitution attacks. The only way to achieve a meaningful security guarantee (CPA-security) is to use a nonce-based encryption that must keep state. Unfortunately, only stateless schemes are deployable effectively with the current network technology and indeed all encryption algorithms currently in use are in this class.
In this paper we analyze digital signature schemes under the so-called subversion attacks (SAs) , that in particular include algorithm-substitution and kleptographic attacks as a special case, but additionally cover more general malware and virus attacks (see below). Unlike encryption, we show positive results and truly efficient schemes that provide the strongest security guarantee and can thus be deployed within real systems. We stress that our intention is not to propose schemes that can be abused by criminals to avoid monitoring. We are motivated by pure scientific curiosity and aspire to contribute to an active field of research.
Our Results and Techniques
We introduce a new and generic framework and definitions for subversions of digital signatures. In the standard blackbox setting, a signature scheme should remain unforgeable even against an adversary able to obtain signatures on (polynomially many) chosen messages. Our security definitions empower the adversary with the ability of continuously subverting the signing algorithm within a class A of allowed SAs. For each chosen subversion in the class, the adversary can access an oracle that answers (polynomially many) signature queries using the subverted signature algorithm. Importantly, the different subversions can be chosen in a fully-adaptive manner possibly depending on the target verification key of the user. We believe our model is very general and flexible, as it nicely generalizes previous models and definitions. First off, when the class A consists of a set of algorithms containing a secretly embedded backdoor, and in case the adversary is restricted to non-adaptively choose only a single subversion algorithm from this class, we obtain the setting of algorithm-substitution and kleptographic attacks as a special case. However, we note that the above definition is far more general as it covers (fully-adaptive and continuous) tampering with the computation performed by the signing algorithm (within the class A). This models, for instance, a machine running a signature software infected by a malware, e.g., via a buffer overflow attack as described by Pincus and Baker at Oakland '04 [37] ; we also obtain memory and randomness tampering (see Section 1.3) as a special case. We refer the reader to Section 3.1 (where we introduce our model formally) for a more comprehensive discussion.
Clearly, without making any restriction on the class A (or without making additional assumptions) there is no hope for security: An arbitrary subverted signature algorithm could, for instance, just ignore all inputs and output the secret key. In this paper we investigate two approaches to tackle attacks of this sort and obtain positive results.
• Limiting the adversarial power. We consider a setting where the adversarial goal is to subvert the signature algorithm in a way that is undetectable to the end-user (or at least allows to maintain plausible deniability). For instance the simple attack abovewhere the subversion outputs the secret key-is easily detectable given only public information. As we show in Section 5, requiring that the class A satisfies a basic undetectability requirement already allows for interesting positive results.
• Using a Reverse Firewall. In Section 6 we show that security against arbitrary tampering with the computation can be achieved, by making the additional assumption of an un-tamperable cryptographic reverse firewall (RF) [33] . Roughly, a RF takes as input a message/signature pair and is allowed to "sanitize" the input signature using only public information.
A more detailed description of our techniques follows.
Negative results. We define what it means for a class A of SAs to be undetectable; roughly this means that a user, given polynomially many queries, cannot distinguish the output of the genuine signature algorithm from the output of the subverted algorithm. See Section 3.2 for a precise definition. Our definitions of undetectability are similar in spirit to the ones put forward by [6] for the setting of symmetric encryption. Importantly we distinguish the case where the user (trying to detect the attack) knows only public or private information (i.e., it knows the secret key).
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Next, we explore the possibility of designing classes of SAs that are (even secretly) undetectable and yet allow for complete security breaches. This direction was already pursued by Bellare et al., who showed that it is possible to stealthily bias the random coins of sufficiently randomized symmetric encryption schemes in a way that allows to extract the secret key after observing a sufficient number of (subverted) ciphertexts. As a first negative result, we explain how to adapt the "biased randomness attack" of [6] to the case of signature schemes.
The above generic attack requires that the underlying signature scheme uses a minimal amount of randomness (say, 7 bits). This leaves the interesting possibility that less randomized schemes (such as the Katz-Wang signature scheme introduced at CCS '03 [29] , using only one bit of randomness) might be secure. In Section 4, we present a new attack showing that this possibility is vacuous: Our attack allows to stealthily bias the randomness in a way that later becomes possible to extract the signing key-regardless of the number of random bits required by the scheme-assuming that the targeted signature scheme is coin-extractable. The latter roughly means that the random coins used for generating signatures can be extracted efficiently from the signature itself; as we discuss in more detail in Section 4.2 many real schemes (including Katz-Wang) are coin-extractable.
Positive results. We complement the above negative results by showing that deterministic schemes with unique 2 signatures are subversion-resilient against the class of SAs that satisfies the so-called verifiability condition.
3 This essentially means that-for all values in the message spacesignatures produced by the subverted signature algorithm should (almost always) verify correctly under the target verification key. Note that both attacks mentioned above fall into this category.
Clearly, the assumption that the verifiability condition should hold for all messages is quite a strong one. Unfortunately, as recently shown by Degabriele et al. [15] for the case of symmetric encryption, it is not possible to relax the verifiability condition to hold for all but a negligible fraction of the messages and still prove security under chosenmessage attacks (where the adversary has full control on the messages to be signed). In the full version of this paper [3] we prove that one can relax the verifiability condition and still obtain a positive result for unique signatures under random-message attacks (where the adversary is only allowed to see signatures of random messages). Interestingly, this has useful applications, e.g., to construct subversionresilient identification schemes (similar in spirit to leakageand tamper-resilient identification [2, 12, 21, 22, 35] ).
Next, we shift our focus to the more ambitious goal of protecting signature schemes against arbitrary SAs, using cryptographic RFs. The latter primitive was recently introduced in [33] to model the security of arbitrary two-party protocols run on machines possibly corrupted by a virus. On a high level, a RF for a signature scheme is a trusted piece of software taking as input a message/signature pair (m, σ) and some public state, and outputting a "patched" signature (m, σ ); the initial state of the firewall is typically a function of the verification key vk . A good RF should maintain functionality, meaning that whenever the input is a valid message/signature pair the patched signature (almost always) verifies correctly under the target verification key. Moreover, we would like the firewall to preserve unforgeability; this means that patched signatures (corresponding to signatures generated via the subverted signing algorithm) should not help an adversary to forge on a fresh message.
We prove that re-randomizable signature schemes [26] admit a RF that preserves unforgeability against arbitrary SAs. Re-randomizable signatures admit an efficient algorithm ReRand that takes as input a tuple (m, σ, vk ) and outputs a signature σ that is distributed uniformly over the set of all valid signatures on message m (under vk ); unique signatures, for instance, are re-randomizable. Upon input a pair (m, σ) our firewall uses the public state to verify (m, σ) is valid under vk , and, in case the test passes, it runs ReRand on (m, σ) and outputs the result. Otherwise the firewall simply returns an invalid symbol ⊥ and self-destructs, i.e., it stops processing any further query. 4 The latter is a requirement that we prove to be unavoidable: No RF can at the same time maintain functionality and preserve unforgeability of a signature scheme without the self-destruct capability. We remark that our results for the setting of RFs are incomparable to the ones in [33] . The main result of Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz is a compiler that takes as input an arbitrary two-party protocol and outputs a functionally equivalent (but different) protocol that admits a RF preserving both functionality and security. Instead, we model directly security of RFs for signatures schemes in the gamebased setting; while our goal is more restricted (in that we only design RFs for signatures), our approach results in much more efficient and practical solutions.
Multi-user setting. Our discussion so far only considered a single user. In the full version [3] we discuss how our models and results can be extended to the important (and practically relevant) multi-user scenario. In particular, similarly to [6] , we generalize our undetectability and security notions to a setting with u > 1 users, where each user has a different signing/verification key. As we argue, security in the single-user setting already implies security in the multiuser setting (by a standard hybrid argument). This does not hold for undetectability, as there exists classes of SAs that are undetectable by a single user but can be efficiently detected by more than one user. However, as we show in [3] , the concrete attacks analysed in Section 4 can be modified to remain undetectable even with multiple users.
Impact
Our study has strong implications in practice and might influence the way digital signature schemes are selected or adopted in standards and protocols. A subverted signature scheme is arguably even more deceitful and dangerous in practice than subverted encryption. Indeed, it is well-known that authenticated encryption must involve digital certificates that are signed by Certification Authorities (CAs). If a CA is using a subverted signature scheme, it is reasonable to expect the signing key will eventually be exposed. With knowledge of the signing key, it is possible to impersonate any user and carry out elementary man-in-the-middle attacks. This renders the use of any type of encryption utterly pointless and underlines the important role played by signatures in the context of secure communications.
Unfortunately, signature schemes currently employed to sign digital certificates, or used in protocols such as OTR, TLS/SSL, SSH, PGP, etc., are all susceptible to a subversion attack and their use should possibly be discontinued. The positive news however is that there already exist signature schemes that are subversion-resilient and they are efficient and well-established. This is in contrast with encryption where good schemes are not deployable in all contexts since they require retention of state information (see [6] ).
Related Work
Sabotage of cryptographic primitives before and during their deployment has been the focus of extensive research over the past years. We review the main results below.
Subliminal channels and beyond. After their introduction, the potential of subliminal channels has been explored in several works (e.g., [10, 16] ); this line of research led for instance to the concept of divertible protocols, that are intimately related to reverse firewalls.
The setting of backdoored implementations has also been the focus of extensive research. This includes, in particular, the realm of kleptography and SETUP attacks (see [45] for a survey). In recent work, Dodis et al. [18] provide a formal treatment of trapdoored pseudorandom generators (building on previous work of Vazirani and Vazirani [41] ); this setting is of particular importance, given the potential sabotage of the NIST Dual EC PRG. We refer the reader to [39] for a complete taxonomy of these (and more) types of attacks.
Tampering attacks. A related line of research analyzes the security of cryptosystems against tampering attacks. Most of these works are restricted to the simpler setting of memory tampering (sometimes known as related-key security), where only the secret key of a targeted cryptoscheme is subject to tampering. In this context we know of many positive results, both for specific (e.g., [5, 13, 28] ) and arbitrary primitives (e.g., [14, 20, 23, 30] ).
An alternative setting is that of randomness tampering, where the random coins of a cryptographic algorithm are subject to tampering. For instance Austrin et al. [4] considers so-called p-tampering attacks, that can efficiently tamper with each bit of the random tape with probability p. In this setting they show that some cryptographic tasks (including commitment and zero-knowledge protocols) are impossible to achieve, while other tasks (in particular signature and identification schemes) can be securely realized.
PRELIMINARIES

Notation
For a string x, we denote its length by |x|; if X is a set, |X | represents the number of elements in X . When x is chosen randomly in X , we write x ←$ X . When A is an algorithm, we write y ← A(x) to denote a run of A on input x and output y; if A is randomized, then y is a random variable and A(x; r) denotes a run of A on input x and randomness r. An algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is randomized and for any input x, r ∈ {0, 1} * the computation of A(x; r) terminates in at most poly(|x|) steps.
We denote with κ ∈ N the security parameter. A function negl : N → R is negligible in the security parameter (or simply negligible) if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in κ, i.e. negl (κ) = κ −ω(1) . The statistical distance between two random variables A and B defined over the same domain D is defined as
We rely on the following lemma (which follows directly from the definition of statistical distance): Lemma 1. Let A and B be a pair of random variables, and E be an event defined over the probability space of A and B. Then, SD (A; B) ≤ SD (A; B|¬E) + P [E].
Signature Schemes
A signature scheme is a triple of algorithms SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) specified as follows: (i) KGen takes as input the security parameter κ and outputs a verification/signing key pair (vk , sk) ∈ VK×SK, where VK := VKκ and SK := SKκ denote the sets of all verification and secret keys produced by KGen(1 κ ); (ii) Sign takes as input the signing key sk ∈ SK, a message m ∈ M and random coins r ∈ R, and outputs a signature σ ∈ Σ; (iii) Vrfy takes as input the verification key vk ∈ VK and a pair (m, σ), and outputs a bit that equals 1 iff σ is a valid signature for message m under key vk . Correctness of a signature scheme says that verifying honestly generated signatures always works (with overwhelming probability over the randomness of all involved algorithms). Definition 1. Let SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme. SS satisfies νc-correctness if for all m ∈ M P Vrfy(vk , (m, Sign(sk , m))) = 1 :
where the probability is taken over the randomness of KGen, Sign, and Vrfy.
The standard notion of security for a signature scheme demands that no PPT adversary given access to a signing oracle, can forge a signature on a "fresh" message (not asked to the oracle).
Definition 2. Let SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme. We say that SS is (t, q, ε)-existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks ((t, q, ε)-ufcma in short) if for all PPT adversaries A running in time t it holds:
where Q = {m1, . . . , mq} denotes the set of queries to the signing oracle.
Unique signatures. For our positive results we rely on so called unique signatures, that we define next. Informally a signature scheme is unique if for any message there is a single signature that verifies w.r.t. a honestly generated verification key.
Definition 3. Let SS be a signature scheme. SS satisfies νu-uniqueness if ∀m ∈ M and ∀σ1, σ2 s.t. σ1 = σ2
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the verification and key generation algorithms.
Full Domain Hash signatures with trapdoor permutations, for instance RSA-FDH [7] , are unique. Sometimes unique signatures are also known as verifiable unpredictable functions (VUFs).
5 Known constructions of VUFs exist based on strong RSA [32] , and on several variants of the DiffieHellman assumption in bilinear groups [1, 17, 19, 27, 31] .
Pseudorandom Functions
Let F : {0, 1}
κ × X → Y be an efficient keyed function, where X and Y denote the domain and the range of F . Denote by F the set of all functions mapping X into Y.
Definition 4. A function F : {0, 1}
κ ×X → Y is a (t, q, ε)-secure pseudorandom function (PRF), if for all adversaries D running in time at most t we have
where D asks at mostueries to its oracle.
SUBVERTING SIGNATURES
We proceed to define what it means for an adversary B to subvert a signature scheme SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy). We model subversion as the ability of the adversary to replace the genuine signing algorithm with a different algorithm within a certain class A of Subversion Attacks (SAs). A subversion of SS is an algorithm A ∈ A, specified as follows.
• Algorithm A(·, ·; ·) takes as input a signing key sk ∈ SK, a message m ∈ M, random coins r ∈ R, and outputs a subverted signature σ ∈ Σ, where σ := A(sk , m; r). Notice that algorithm A is completely arbitrary, with the only restriction that it maintains the same input-output interfaces as the original signing algorithm.
In particular, algorithm A can hard-wire arbitrary information chosen by the adversary, which we denote by a string α ∈ {0, 1} * . In general we also allow algorithm A to be stateful, even in case the original signing algorithm is not, and we denote the corresponding state by τ ∈ {0, 1} * ; the state is only used internally by the subverted algorithm and never outputted to the outside.
In Section 3.1 we define what it means for a signature scheme to be secure against a certain class of SAs. In Section 3.2 we define what it means for a class of SAs to be undetectable by a user. Some of our definitions are similar in spirit to the ones put forward in [6] , except that our modelling of subversion is more general (see below for a more detailed comparison).
Impersonation
We consider two security definitions, corresponding to different adversarial goals. In the first definition, it is required that an adversary B having access to polinomially many subversion oracles chosen adaptively (possibly depending on the user's verification key), cannot distinguish signatures produced via the standard signing algorithm from subverted signatures.
Definition 5. Let SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme, and A be some class of SAs for SS. We say that SS is (t, n, q, ε)-indistinguishable w.r.t continuous A-SAs if for all PPT adversaries B running in time t, we have P [B wins] − 2. The adversary B can ask the following two types of queries; the queries can be specified adaptively and in an arbitrary order:
• Choose an algorithm Aj ∈ A, for j ∈ [n], and give it to the challenger.
• Forward a pair (j, mi,j) to the challenger, where i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [n]. The answer to each query depends on the value of the secret bit b. In particular, if b = 1, the output is σi,j ← Sign(sk , mi,j); if b = 0, the output is σi,j ← Aj(sk , mi,j).
3. Finally, B outputs a value b ∈ {0, 1}; we say that B wins iff b = b.
We also consider an alternative (strictly weaker-see the full version [3] ) definition, where the goal of the adversary is now to forge a signature on a "fresh" message (not asked to any of the oracles).
Definition 6. Let
SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme, and A be some class of SAs for SS. We say that SS is (t, n, q, ε)-hard to impersonate w.r.t. continuous ASAs if for all PPT adversaries B running in time t, we have P [B wins] ≤ ε(κ) in the following game: 1. The challenger runs (vk , sk ) ← KGen(1 κ ), and gives vk to B.
The adversary B is given oracle access to Sign(sk , ·).
Upon input the i-th query mi, this oracle returns σi ← Sign(sk , mi); let Q = {m1, . . . , mq} be the set of all queried messages.
3. For each j ∈ [n], the adversary B can adaptively choose an algorithm Aj ∈ A. For each algorithm, B is given oracle access to Aj(sk , ·). Upon input a message mi,j, the oracle returns σi,j ← Aj(sk , mi,j); let Qj = { m1,j, . . . , mq,j} be the set of all queried messages to the oracle Aj.
4. Finally, B outputs a pair (m * , σ * ); we say that B wins iff Vrfy(vk , (m * , σ * )) = 1 and m * ∈ Q ∪ Q, where Q := n j=1 Qj. Some remarks on the above definitions are in order.
• First, note that it is impossible to prove that a signature scheme SS satisfies Definition 5 (and consequently Definition 6) for an arbitrary class A, without making further assumptions. 6 To see this, consider the simple algorithm that ignores all inputs and outputs the secret key.
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• We observe that continuous A-SAs security, implies security against continuous tampering attacks with the secret key. This can be seen by considering a class of algorithms A key = { A f } f ∈F , where F is a class of functions such that each f ∈ F has a type f : SK → SK, and for all f ∈ F, m ∈ M and r ∈ R we have that A f (·, m; r) := Sign(f (·), m; r). In case the secret key is too long, one can make the algorithm stateful so that it outputs a different chunk of the key at each invocation. 8 It is worth noting that already for n = 1 Definition 6 implies non-adaptive key tampering, as the subverted algorithm can hard-wire (the description of) polynomially many pre-set tampering functions.
• It is useful to compare Definition 5 to the definition of security against algorithm-substitution attacks given in [6] (for the case of symmetric encryption). In the language of Bellare et al. [6] , a subversion of a signature scheme would be a triple of algorithms SS = ( KGen, Sign, Vrfy), where in the security game KGen is run by the challenger in order to obtain a trapdoor α ∈ {0, 1} * and some initial state τ ∈ {0, 1} * which are both hard-wired in the algorithm Sign := Sign α,τ (and given to B).
9
The above setting can be cast in our framework by considering the class of SAs A BRP14 := { Aα,τ : (α, τ ) ← KGen(1 κ )}, and by setting n = 1 in Definition 5. Our definition is more general, as it accounts for arbitrary classes of SAs and moreover allows B to subvert a user's algorithm continuously and in a fully-adaptive fashion (possibly depending on the target verification key).
Public versus Secret Undetectability
We say that A meets the verifiability condition relative to SS if for all A ∈ A and for all m ∈ M the signatures produced using the subverted signing algorithm A (almost) always verify under the corresponding verification key vk . Such a verifiability condition is a very basic form of (public) undetectability.
Definition 7. Let A be some class of SAs for a signature scheme SS. We say that A satisfies νv-verifiability if for all A ∈ A and for all m ∈ M P Vrfy(vk , (m, A(sk , m))) = 1 :
where the probability is taken over the randomness of all involved algorithms.
By undetectability, we mean the inability of ordinary users to tell whether signatures are computed using the subverted or the genuine signing algorithm. We will distinguish between the case where a subversion is publicly or secretly undetectable. Roughly speaking, public undetectability means that no user can detect subversions using the verification key vk only (i.e., without knowing the signing key sk ); secret undetectability means that no user, even with knowledge of the signing key sk , can detect subversions.
A formal definition follows. While reading it, bear in mind that the challenger plays the role of the "bad guy" trying to sabotage the signature scheme without being detected. Definition 8. Let SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme, and A be some class of SAs for SS. We say that A is secretly (t, q, ε)-undetectable w.r.t. SS if for all PPT users U running in time t, there exists an efficient challenger such that P [U wins] − 2. The user U can ask queries mi ∈ M, for all i ∈ [q]. The answer to each query depends on the secret bit 9 The algorithm Vrfy can be considered as part of the adversary itself.
b. In particular, if b = 1, the challenger returns σi ← Sign(sk , mi); if b = 0, the challenger returns σi ← A( sk , mi).
3. Finally, U outputs a value b ∈ {0, 1}; we say that U wins iff b = b.
We say that A is publicly undetectable w.r.t. SS if in step 1. of the above game, U is only given the verification key.
Our definition of undetectability is similar to the corresponding definition considered by Bellare et al. [6] for the case of symmetric encryption. One key difference is that, in the definition above, the challenger is allowed to choose the subversion algorithm possibly depending on the verification key of the user. While one could in principle define even stronger forms of undetectability, e.g. by requiring that continuous and fully-adaptive SAs remain undetectable, we do not pursue this direction here. The reason for this is that the attacks we analyze in Section 4 are non-adaptive and only require to use a single subversion.
Secret vs. public undetectability. Whereas secret undetectability implies public undetectability, the converse is not true. A separation is provided by looking at derandomized schemes that rely on a PRF with key s to compute the randomness r used by the signing algorithm Sign(sk , m; r). It is not hard to show that the class of SAs considered by Bellare et al. [6] , when adapted and applied to derandomized signature schemes (see Section 4.1), is publicly undetectable, but secretly detectable.
Public undetectability vs. verifiability. One might believe that verifiability is a special case of public undetectability. However, this is not true and in fact Definition 7 and 8 are incomparable. To see this, consider the class of SAs Amsg = { Am}m∈M that behaves identically to the original signing algorithm, except that upon inputm ∈ M it outputs an invalid signature. Clearly, Amsg satisfies public undetectability as a user has only a negligible chance of hitting the valuem; yet Amsg does not meet the verifiability condition as the latter is a property that holds for all messages.
On the other hand, consider the class of SAs A det that is identical to the original signing algorithm, except that it behaves deterministically on repeated inputs. Clearly, A det meets the verifiability condition relative to any (even randomized) signature scheme SS; yet A det does not satisfy public undetectability, as a user can simply query the same message twice in order to guess the value of the hidden bit b with overwhelming probability.
MOUNTING SUBVERSION ATTACKS
In Section 4.1 we show that the biased-randomness attack of [6] (adapted to the case of signatures), satisfies secret undetectability as per Definition 8 while allowing to recover the user's signing key with overwhelming probability. This attack allows to break all signature schemes using a sufficient amount of randomness; in Section 4.2 we present a new attack allowing to surreptitiously subvert even signature schemes using only little randomness (say 1 bit), provided that the targeted scheme satisfies an additional property.
SA class A F bias
Let SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) be a randomized signature scheme with randomness space R, and F : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} be a pseudorandom function. The class A F bias consists of a set of algorithms { As,τ } s∈{0,1} κ ,τ =1 , where each algorithm in the class behaves as follows:
As,τ (sk , m):
• For |sk | = , let i := τ mod .
• Define the function g(·) := Sign(sk , m; ·)||τ and sample a random element r from the distribution
• Return the signature σ := Sign(sk , m; r), and update the state τ ← τ + 1.
Extracting the signing key. 
Attacking Randomized Schemes
The following attack is based on the biased-randomness attack from [6] . Roughly, what it does is to embed a trapdoor -a key for a pseudorandom function-in the subverted signing algorithm and to "bias" the randomness in a way that it becomes possible to any party that knows the trapdoor to leak one bit of the signing key for each signed messaged under that signing key. Hence, if the adversary can obtain at least |sk | signed messages then it can later extract the entire signing key in full.
For the analysis, which appears in the full version [3] , we will need to assume the signing function is coin-injective, i.e. it is injective w.r.t. its random coins.
κ × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} be a (t prf , q prf , ε prf )-secure PRF. For a randomized, coin-injective signature scheme SS with randomness space of size ρ = |R|, consider the class of SAs A bias is secretly (t, q, ε)-undetectable for t ≈ t prf , q ≈ q prf and ε ≤ q · 2 −(ρ+1) + ε prf .
(ii) Each A ∈ A F bias recovers the signing key of the user with probability at least (1 − (0.5 + ε prf ) ρ ) , where is the size of the key.
Notice that for the attack to be undetectable with high probability, the underlying signature scheme needs to rely on a minimal amount of randomness, say ρ ≥ 2 7 .
Making the attack stateless. Note that the attack of Fig. 1 requires the subverted signature algorithm to be stateful. See the full version [3] for a stateless version of the same attack.
Attacking Schemes with Small Randomness
The attack on Section 4.1 allows to break all sufficiently randomized schemes. This leaves the interesting possibility to show a positive result for schemes using less randomness, e.g., the Katz-Wang scheme [29] that uses a single bit of randomness. In this section we present a simple attack (cf. Fig. 2 ) ruling out the above possibility for all signature schemes that are coin-extractable, a notion which we define next.
Definition 9. Let SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme. We say that SS is νext-coin-extractable if there exists a PPT algorithm CExt such that for all m ∈ M P σ = Sign(sk , m; r) :
We point that many existing signature schemes are coinextractable:
• All public-coin signature schemes [38] , where the random coins used to generate a signature are included as part of the signature. For instance, the schemes in [9, 24, 34] , and the Unstructured Rabin-Williams scheme [8] are all public-coin.
• The Katz-Wang scheme [29] , where the signature on a message m is computed as σ = f −1 (H(m||r)) such that f is a trapdoor permutation, H is a hash function, and r is random bit. Given a pair (m, σ) the extractor simply sets r = 1 iff f (σ) = H(m||1).
• The PSS signature standard [7, 11] .
Theorem 2. For a νext-coin-extractable, randomized signature scheme SS with randomness space R of size ρ = 2 d , consider the class of SAs Acext described in Fig. 2 . Then, (i) Acext is secretly (t, q, 0)-undetectable for t, q ∈ N.
(ii) Each A ∈ Acext recovers the signing key of the user with probability at least (1 − νext) /d , where is the size of the key.
Proof. (i) Let G be the game described in Definition 8, where the challenger picks A ←$ Acext uniformly at random (and independently of the user's verification key). Consider the game G0, an identical copy of game G when b = 0, and consider the game G1, an identical copy of game G when b = 1. For the first part of the proof the objective is to show that G0 ≈ G1.
SA class Acext
Let SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) be a coin-extractable, randomized signature scheme with randomness space R of size ρ = 2 d . For simplicity assume that d| , where is the size of the signing key (a generalization is straightforward). The class Acext consists of a set of algorithms { As,τ } s∈{0,1} ,τ =0 , where each algorithm in the class behaves as follows:
• If τ ≥ output a honestly generated signature σ := Sign(sk , m; r).
•
Extracting the signing key. Given as input a vector of signatures σ = (σ1, . . . , σ /d ), parse the trapdoor s as /d chunks of d bits s = {s1, . . . , s /d }. For each signature σi ∈ σ try to extract the d-bit chunk sk i of the signing key as follows.
• Extract the randomness from the i-th signature r ← CExt(vk , mi, σi).
Return the signing key sk := (sk 1 , . . . , sk /d ). Proof. Abusing notation, let us write G0 and G1 for the distribution of the random variables corresponding to U's view in games G0 and G1 respectively. For an index i ∈ [0, q] consider the hybrid game Hi that answers the first i queries as in game G0 while all the subsequent queries are answered as in G1. We note that H0 ≡ G1 and Hq ≡ G0.
We claim that for all i ∈ [q], we have Hi−1 ≡ Hi. To see this, fix some i ∈ [q] and denote with R (resp. R) the random variable defined by sampling an element from R (resp. R) uniformly at random. It is easy to see that R and R are identically distributed, as the biased distribution consists of a one-time pad encryption of (part of) the signing key with a uniform key. The claim follows.
(ii) For the second part of the proof we note that the attack of Fig. 2 successfully recovers the biased randomness r of each σi ∈ {σ1, . . . , σ /d } and computes the chunk ski of the signing key with probability at least 1 − νext. This gives a total probability of recovering the entire signing key of at
Making the attack stateless. Note that the attack of Fig. 2 requires the subverted signature algorithm to be stateful. See the full version [3] for a stateless version of the same attack.
SECURITY OF UNIQUE SIGNATURES
The theorem below shows that unique signature schemes (cf. Definition 3) are secure against the class of all SAs that meet the verifiability condition (cf. Definition 7).
Theorem 3. Let SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme with νc-correctness and νu-uniqueness, and denote by A νv ver the class of algorithms that satisfy νv-verifiability relative to SS. Then SS is (t, n, q, ε)-indistinguishable against continuous A νv ver -SAs, for all n, q ∈ N and for ε ≤ qn · (νc + νv + νu).
Proof. Let G be the game described in Definition 5. Consider the game G0, an identical copy of game G when b = 0, and consider the game G1, an identical copy of game G when b = 1. The objective here is to show that G0 ≈ G1.
For an index k ∈ [0, n], consider the hybrid game H k that answers each query (j, mi,j) such that j ≤ k as in game G0 (i.e., by running Sign(sk , mi,j)), while all queries (j, mi,j) such that j > k are answered as in G1 (i.e., by running Aj(sk , mi,j)). We note that H0 ≡ G1 and Hn ≡ G0. Abusing notation, let us write G k for the distribution of the random variable corresponding to B's view in games G k .
Fix a particular k ∈ [0, n], and for an index l ∈ [0, q] consider the hybrid game H k,l that is identical to H k except that queries (k, m i,k ) with i ≤ l are treated as in game G0, while queries (k, m i,k ) with i > l are treated as in G1.
Observe that H k,0 ≡ H k−1 , and
Proof. Notice that the only difference between H k,l−1 and H k,l is how the two games answer the query (k, m l,k ):
Eq. (2) follows by Lemma 1 and Eq. (3) follows by the fact that H k,l−1 and H k,l are identically distributed conditioned on E l,k not happening, and moreover P [E l,k ] ≤ νc + νu + νv. The latter can also be seen as follows. By the correctness condition of SS we have that σ l,k is valid for m l,k under vk except with probability at most νc. By the assumption that A k ∈ A νv ver we have that σ l,k is also valid for m l,k under vk except with probability at most νv. Finally, by the uniqueness property of SS we have that σ l,k and σ l,k must be equal except with probability at most νu. It follows that P [E l,k ] ≤ νc + νu + νv, as desired.
The statement now follows by the above claim and by the triangle inequality, as
≤ qn · (νc + νu + νv).
FIREWALLS FOR SIGNATURES
In Section 5 we have shown that unique signatures are secure against a restricted class of SAs, namely all SAs that meet the so-called verifiability condition. As discussed in Section 3, by removing the latter requirement (i.e., allowing for arbitrary classes of SAs in Definition 5 and 6) would require that a signature scheme SS remains unforgeable even against an adversary allowed arbitrary tampering with the computation performed by the signing algorithm. This is impossible without making further assumptions.
In this section we explore to what extent one can model signature schemes secure against arbitrary tampering with the computation, by making the extra assumption of an un-tamperable cryptographic reverse firewall (RF) [33] . Roughly, a RF for a signature scheme is a (possibly stateful) algorithm that takes as input a message/signature pair and outputs an updated signature; importantly the firewall has to do so using only public information (in particular, without knowing the signing key).
Definition 10. Let SS be a signature scheme. A RF for SS is a pair of algorithms F W = (Setup, Patch) specified as follows: (i) Setup takes as input the security parameter and a verification key vk ∈ VK, and outputs some initial (public) state δ ∈ {0, 1} * ; (ii) Patch takes as input the current (public) state δ, and a message-signature pair (m, σ) and outputs a possibly modified signature or a special symbol ⊥ and an updated (public) state δ . We write this as σ ← Patch δ (m, σ) (and omit to denote the updated state δ as an explicit output).
Properties
Below, we discuss the correctness and security requirements of cryptographic RF F W for a signature scheme SS.
Maintaining functionality. The first basic property of a RF is that it should preserve the functionality of the underlying signature scheme, i.e. if a signature σ on a message m is computed using signing key sk , and the firewall is initialized with the corresponding verification key vk , the patched signatures σ should (almost always) be a valid signatures for m under vk . More precisely, we say that F W is functionality maintaining for SS, if for any polynomial p(κ) and any vector of inputs (m1, . . . , mp) ∈ M, there exists a negligible function ν :
where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of all involved algorithms. Recall that each invocation of algorithm Patch updates the (public) state δ of the RF.
Preserving Unforgeability. The second property of a RF is a security requirement. Note that a firewall can never "create" security (as it does not know the signing key). Below we define what it means for a RF to preserve unforgeability of a signature scheme against arbitrary tampering attacks.
Definition 11. Let SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) be a signature scheme with RF FW = (Setup, Patch). We say that F W (t, n, q, ε)-preserves unforgeability for SS against continuous SAs if for all adversaries B running in time t we have that P [B wins] ≤ ε in the following game:
1. The challenger runs (vk , sk ) ← KGen(1 κ ), computes δ ← Setup(vk , 1 κ ), and gives (vk , δ) to B.
2. The adversary B is given oracle access to Sign(sk , ·).
Upon input the i-th query mi, this oracle returns σi ← Sign(sk , mi). Let Q = {m1, . . . , mq} be the set of all signature queries.
3. The adversary B can adaptively choose an arbitrary algorithm Aj, and correspondingly obtain oracle access to Patch δ (·, Aj(sk , ·)):
• Upon input the i-th query mi,j, for i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [n], the oracle returns σi,j ← Patch δ ( mi,j, Aj(sk , mi,j)) and updates the public state δ; • Whenever σi,j = ⊥ the oracle enters a special selfdestructs mode, in which the answer to all future queries is by default set to ⊥.
Let Qj = { m1,j, . . . , mq,j} be the set of all queries for each Aj.
4. Finally, B outputs a pair (m * , σ * ); we say that B wins iff Vrfy(vk , (m * , σ * )) = 1 and m * ∈ Q ∪ Q, where Q := n j=1 Qj. Whenever A specifies all of its queries { Aj, mi,j} j∈[n],i∈ [q] at the same time we say that FW non-adaptively preserves unforgeability.
We observe that Definition 11 is very similar to Definition 6, except for a few crucial differences. First, note that the above definition considers arbitrary classes of SAs instead of SAs within a given class A; this is possible because the output of each invocation of the subverted signing algorithm is patched using the firewall (which is assumed to be un-tamperable).
Second, observe that the above definition relies on the so-called self-destruct capability: Whenever the firewall returns ⊥, all further queries to any of the oracles results in ⊥; as we show in Section 6.2 this is necessary as without such a capability there exists simple generic attacks that allow for complete security breaches. We stress, however, that the assumption of the self-destruct capability does not make the problem of designing an unforgeability preserving reverse firewall trivial. In fact, the attacks of Section 4 allow to break all randomized scheme without ever provoking a self-destruct. On the positive side, in Section 6.3, we show how to design an unforgeability preserving RF for any re-randomizable signature scheme.
Exfiltration resistance. More in general, one might require a stronger security property from a RF. Namely, we could ask that patched signatures are indistinguishable from real signatures to the eyes of an attacker. This property, which is called exfiltration resistance in [33] , would be similar in spirit to our definition of indistinguishability w.r.t. continuous SAs (see Definition 5) .
It is not hard to see that exfilatration resistance against arbitrary SAs is impossible to achieve in the case of signature schemes; this is because the attacker could simply set the subverted signing algorithm to always output the all-zero string, in which case the RF has no way to patch its input to a valid signature. 10 
Necessity of Self-Destruct
We show that no RF can preserve both functionality and unforgeability, without assuming the self-destruct capability. This is achieved via a generic (non-adaptive) attack that allows to extract the secret key in case the RF does not self-destruct. The attack itself is a generalization of a similar attack by Gennaro et al. [25] in the context of memory tampering.
Theorem 4. Let SS be a ufcma signature scheme. No RF F W can be functionality maintaining and non-adaptively (poly(κ), 1, poly(κ), negl (κ))-preserve unforgeability for SS, without assuming the self-destruct capability.
Proof sketch. Consider the following adversary B playing the game of Definition 11 (omitting the self-destruct capability).
• Upon input the verification key vk , and the initial state δ, initialize τ := 1.
• Forward Aτ to the challenger, where algorithm Aτ is defined as follows: Upon input a message mi, set j = τ mod (where := |sk |) and -If sk [j] = 1, output σi ← Sign(sk , mi).
-Else, output 0 |σ| .
Update τ ← τ + 1.
• Let (m, σ 1 ), . . . , (m, σ ) be the set of tampered signature queries (and answers to these queries) asked by B, where σ i ← Patch δ (m, Aτ (sk ,m)). Define sk [i] = Vrfy(vk , (m, σ i )) and return sk := (sk [1] , . . . , sk [ ]).
Notice that B specifies its queries non-adaptively, and moreover it only uses one subversion which is queried upon a fixed messagem ∈ M. We will show that the extracted key sk is equal to the original secret key sk with overwhelming probability, which clearly implies the statement. The proof is by induction; assume that the statement is true up to some index i ≥ 1. We claim that sk [i + 1] = sk [i + 1] with all but negligible probability. To see this, define the event Ei+1 that sk [i + 1] = 0 and Vrfy(vk , (m, σ i+1 )) = 1 or sk [i + 1] = 1 and Vrfy(vk , (m, σ i+1 )) = 0. By the assumption that the RF does not self-destruct and is functionality maintaining, we get that the latter sub-case happens only 10 We note, however, that our techniques from Section 5 can be extended to design a RF that is weakly exfiltration resistant, namely it is exfiltration resistant against restricted SAs that satisfy the verifiability condition. with negligible probability. On the other hand, if the former sub-case happens we get that the RF forged a signature onm, which contradicts ufcma security of SS. By a union bound, we get that P [Ei+1] is negligible as desired.
Patching Re-Randomizable Signatures
We design a RF preserving unforgeability of so-called rerandomizable signature schemes (that include unique signatures as a special case).
Definition 12. We say that SS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) is efficiently νr -re-randomizable, if there exists a PPT algorithm ReRand such that for all messages m ∈ M and for all (vk , sk ) ← KGen(1 κ ) and σ ← Sign(sk , m), we have that SD(ReRand(vk , m, σ), Sign(sk , m)) ≤ νr .
Note that unique signatures are efficiently re-randomizable, for ReRand(vk , m, σ) = σ and νr = 0; Waters' signature scheme [42] , and its variant by Hofheinz et al. [26] , are also efficiently re-randomizable. Our firewall, which is formally described in Fig. 3 , first checks if σ is a valid signature on message m under key vk (provided that a self-destruct was not provoked yet). If not, it self-destructs and returns ⊥; otherwise it re-randomizes σ and outputs the result. The self-destruct capability is implemented using a one-time writable bit β (which is included in the public state).
Theorem 5. Let SS be a (t, (q + 1)n, ε)-ufcma signature scheme that is efficiently νr -re-randomizable and that satisfies νc-correctness. Then, the RF of Fig. 3 maintains functionality and (t , q, ε )-preserves unforgeability for SS, where t ≈ t and ε ≤ qn · (νc + νr + ε).
Proof. The fact that the firewall maintains functionality follows directly by νc-correctness of SS.
We now show the firewall preserves unforgeability. Let G be the game of Definition 11; we write (i * , j * ) ∈ [q] × [n] for the pair of indexes in which the firewall self-destructs (if any). Consider the modified game H that is identical to G except that tampered signature queries are answered as described below:
• For all j < j * , upon input (j, mi,j) return σi,j ← Sign(sk , mi,j) for all i ∈ [q].
• For j = j * , upon input (j, mi,j) if i < i * return σi,j ← Sign(sk , mi,j); else return ⊥.
